A. D. Smith, ANSELM\u27S OTHER ARGUMENT by Rogers, Katherin
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 32 Issue 2 Article 12 
4-1-2015 
Smith, ANSELM'S OTHER ARGUMENT 
Katherin Rogers 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Rogers, Katherin (2015) "Smith, ANSELM'S OTHER ARGUMENT," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the 
Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 32 : Iss. 2 , Article 12. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol32/iss2/12 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and 
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
BOOK REVIEWS 235 
impressive. Pereboom forcefully argues that anyone who is even moder¬
ately moved by his arguments to doubt the existence of free w i l l must take 
seriously the implications of such skepticism for our practices of blame and 
punishment, since such practices inflict serious harm on their targets, and 
"justification for harm must meet a high epistemic standard" (158). His 
insistent reminder that our debates about the nature and extent of human 
freedom in the metaphysics classroom have implications for everything 
f rom public policy to personal relationships — and that these implications 
must be faced squarely by free w i l l theorists—is to be applauded. 
Anselm's Other Argument, by A . D . Smith. Cambridge, M A : Harvard U n i -
versity Press, 2014. 256 pages. $49.95 (hardback). 
K A T H E R I N ROGERS, University of Delaware 
A . D . Smith takes a winding and uneven route to what 1 find an exciting 
and plausible conclusion: Whether or not Anse lm intended it, there is a 
val id and persuasive argument for the existence of G o d to be found—or at 
least suggested—in Anselm's Replies, that is, in his responses to Gaunilo's 
criticisms of the Proslogion II argument. O n the way to this conclusion, 
Smith argues that, contrary to the views of some, Anselm does not pres¬
ent a Moda l Ontological Argument in Proslogion III, or indeed anywhere 
else. In order to make his case against any modal argument and i n favor 
of the "other" argument of the title, Smith sets out what he takes to be 
Anselm's position on the nature of "conceivability" and "possibility." The 
book, then, is an attempt both to present Anselm's own thinking on some 
issues which are key to certain sorts of proofs for the existence of God, and 
to develop and defend an argument inspired by Anselm's Replies. 
Smith's discussion of Anselm's understanding of conceivability and 
possibility is not as thorough as it might be, and it contains some unneces¬
sary digressions. One such digression offers a brief overview of Anselm's 
position on the question of whether or not there is a best world, such that a 
perfectly good G o d "must" actualize it. The issue comes up in connection 
with Anselm's approach to counterfactuals, but the discussion, though 
several pages long, is not substantive enough to settle the question in terms 
of interpreting Anselm, does not contribute to the perennial philosophical 
debate, and does not seem to have much bearing on Anselm's approach 
to counterfactuals. One can make sense of counterfactuals whether or not 
one holds that ours is the only wor ld a perfect G o d could actualize. 
Regarding the rather "quick" interpretation of Anselm on conceivability 
and possibility, Smith does offer some historical perspective, but it is in the 
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form of briefly citing various late classical and medieval figures to develop 
his various theses. We know that Anselm took Augustine to be his major 
influence, and so the standard approach in interpreting Anselm is to look 
first at Augustine, but Smith does not consider how Augustine might have 
understood conceivability or possibility. (Perhaps Smith is not conversant 
with Augustine. He writes, without qualification, "God, of course, is not in 
any interesting sense like a number" (26). Augustine, famously, held that 
G o d is Numbers (and Wisdom).) 
The other standard move i n interpreting Anselm on some issue is to 
canvas everything he said on the subject. Anselm has a lot to say on how 
our thinking reflects reality (or how reality must reflect our thinking) and 
on what is possible and what is necessary. But his corpus is not large, so 
a thorough assessment would not be too difficult a task. Smith includes 
many important texts on conceivability and possibility, but sometimes 
cites only a short portion of a lengthy discussion, and sometimes does 
not mention a text that seems relevant. For example, the De Concordia, in-
spired by the freedom and foreknowledge dilemma, offers some interest¬
ing distinctions concerning what is necessary and what is possible, but 
Smith does not discuss it. 
That Smith's analysis is not thorough would be a serious problem if 
Smith's book were intended to be the last word on interpreting Anselm's 
own understanding of conceivability and possibility, but that is not the 
aim of the book. More importantly, Smith's interpretations of Anselm on 
conceivability and possibility, while not thoroughly developed, may well 
be correct, even though they are sometimes surprising. For example, Smith 
rightly insists that for Anselm, "Reason intrinsically and essentially, grasps 
and tracks the truth [Smith's italics]"(60). Then Smith attributes to Anselm 
the view that conceivability encompasses what reason demonstrates must 
be the case. 1f reason shows that some state of affairs is impossible, then, 
in some important sense, that state of affairs is "inconceivable." This is not 
the way contemporary philosophers use the term, but Smith has texts to 
support this reading. 
Even more surprising is the analysis of what is "possible." Smith ar¬
gues that in cases when Anselm discusses locutions that seem to ascribe to 
things certain inabilities—that some being, including God, does not have 
an ability (God "cannot" lie, for example)—or when he ascribes to non-
existent beings some ability or inability—the ascription must be parsed 
as involving a power or lack of power on the part of some other existent 
being. Prima facie this seems implausible, but, again, Smith has texts to 
defend the interpretation. A more thorough analysis might well support 
Smith's reading. 
Smith concludes that Anselm's understanding of what is "possible" for 
any being is based on the metaphysical nature and ontological status of the 
being. A n d our "conceiving" what is the case for any being must reflect 
reason's assessment of that nature and status. Thus, in that Anselm had 
a very different understanding of "conceivable" and "possible" than that 
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used in modern M o d a l Ontological Arguments, Smith is able to make the 
historical case against such arguments being made, or somehow embed¬
ded, in Anselm's work. (For those of us who are less fluent in contemporary 
modal logic and its sub-dialects, more explanation of how contemporary 
philosophers distinguish logical and metaphysical possibility, and of what 
exactly is meant by the latter, might have been helpful.) 
As Smith begins to close in on the "other" argument, the trajectory, 
at first, does not look very promising. Smith finds in Anselm's Replies an 
argument of which the crucial premise is, "whatever can be conceived to 
exist and does not exist can be conceived to exist wi th a beginning" (131). 
Smith interprets Anselm to mean that whatever can be conceived to exist 
and does not exist can be conceived to exist wi th a temporal beginning. 
This seems a pretty implausible premise. Smith devotes pages to argu¬
ing that this is indeed Anselm's claim. Then he notes that it is surpris¬
ing that Anselm makes such a claim, i n that he would have had access to 
counter examples and he, himself, contradicts the claim in places. Smith 
then devotes many more pages to arguing that the crucial premise is mis¬
taken, and that what Anselm should have said is that "whatever can be 
conceived to exist and does not exist can be conceived to be caused" (144). 
In fact, the term Anselm uses, which Smith's translation gives as "be¬
ginning," is initio. That can mean a temporal beginning, but it can also 
mean an origin, which could be a source or a cause. Smith notes that 
Anselm also says that a conceivable, non-existent thing can be conceived to 
exist wi th an "end." Aga in Smith assumes Anselm means a temporal end, 
but the term finis can also mean a border or limit or boundary, rather than 
a temporal ending. A charitable, but not unlikely, interpretation wou ld 
have allowed Smith to cut to the chase and suppose that Anselm d id 
indeed propose the claim that Smith holds that he ought to have made, 
and which supports a more persuasive version of the "other" argument. 
(As Smith notes, this "other" argument bears a close family resemblance 
to one which Duns Scotus makes. C o u l d it be that Duns Scotus is the first 
to discover the "other" argument i n Anselm?) 
With some reworking of what Anselm has to say in the Replies, to cast it 
into the contemporary idiom, Smith sets out the "other" argument: 
1) For any essential k ind of thing, if there is not, but possibly could be, 
something of that kind, then it is possible for something of that k ind to 
be caused. 
2) There could possibly be something divine (i.e., of the essential k ind di¬
vine). 
3) It is not possible for anything divine to be caused. 
Therefore, something divine exists (152). 
Prima facie the first premise, which Smith labels "Anselm's Principle," is 
the one which is most likely to offend. Smith shows that it can be supported 
using an extremely weak version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: "for 
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any possibly instantiated essential kind, it is at least possible that there 
should be an instance of that k ind that exists for a reason" (171). This seems 
a difficult claim to deny. Premise 3 is unassailable. The critic, then, should 
probably fall back on defending the claim that it is not, in fact, possible for 
there to be something divine. But this, too, is difficult to argue. Smith con¬
cludes by defending the "other" argument against a couple of Lost Island-
style attacks—successfully, it seems to me. 
In the 900 years since Anselm wrote his Proslogion, there has been a 
large and steady stream of ink spilt over analyzing the arguments in chap¬
ters 2 and 3 and in the Replies. Smith's accomplishment is impressive on 
two counts. He has uncovered something new in those oft-read texts, and 
he has presented his discovery as a plausible argument for the existence 
of God—plausible, at least, to those of us sympathetic to an Anselmian 
approach and hence to arguments which operate entirely within the con¬
fines of what is "conceivable." 
Death, Resurrection, and Transporter Beams: An Introduction to Five Christian 
Views on Life after Death, by Silas N . Langley. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 
2014. 231 pages. 
W I L L I A M H A S K E R , Huntington University 
You are the sole remaining passenger on a spaceship that is programmed 
to self-destruct in one minute. You have before you a control panel wi th 
five buttons; each button represents a possible way i n which you might 
be transported f rom the doomed ship to the friendly surface of a nearby 
planet. You need to choose which button to push; one, and only one, of 
them w i l l bring you safely to the planet. The ship's guidebook gives some 
hints, but unfortunately it lacks clear instructions concerning which is the 
correct button. Time is running out. So begins Silas N . Langley's Death, 
Resurrection, and Transporter Beams. 
The five buttons represent five different Christian views concerning the 
way in which we survive bodily death. They are roughly as follows: 
Soul-flight: You are your soul, your body is just a shell. Your soul is 
transported to the planet; on arrival, you get a new body. 
Particle Beam: You are your body, which is disassembled, teleported to 
your destination, and reassembled. 
Data Stream: Your body is scanned and all your physical and mental 
characteristics are registered in a stream of data that is transmitted to 
the planet, where you are reconstructed and continue your life. 
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